The reform of Article 9 of the Italian Constitution: towards a partial overcoming of an anthropocentric approach?

Chiara Bertoldi, UPO

2025

The adoption of the Italian Constitutional Law No. 1 of February 11, 2022, titled “Amendments to Articles 9 and 41 of the Constitution concerning the protection of the environment,” marks the explicit entry of environmental protection not only into the Italian Constitution but also among its fundamental principles, with significant consequences for the entire legal system. In particular, the reform adds a third paragraph to the two original ones, stating that the Republic “protects the environment, biodiversity, and ecosystems, also in the interest of future generations.”

A joint reading of the elements of Article 9 of the Constitution leads to the affirmation of the definitive emancipation of the environment from a purely anthropocentric perspective, which regards it solely as the object of a subjective human right. Instead, it elevates its protection to a fundamental principle of the legal system. Therefore, the legislator’s decision is certainly to be welcomed, both for the accuracy of the legal classification and due to its consistency with the interpretation offered by the Constitutional Court and with the general principles of environmental law.

Specifically regarding the first point, classifying the environment as a subjective right is legally inadequate for two main reasons: firstly, it confines environmental protection to aspects related only to safeguarding human rights, thereby making it partial; secondly, it fails to provide a definition of the object of the presumed right to the environment that would allow it to be effectively exercised by individuals.

Concerning the first reason, it must be noted that although the environment is necessarily considered in relation to human needs due to the anthropocentric approach that structurally characterizes the legal system, and therefore also the constitutional framework, its classification as a subjective right would render environmental protection merely functional to the fulfilment of human needs. Such a view, in addition to being non-compliant with European and international obligations, is partial and therefore insufficient for the full protection of the environment as such. Thus, while the centrality of the individual remains a crucial element, as it is deeply rooted in Western legal culture based on the humanity/nature dichotomy, it must not translate into human dominance over the environment. Instead, it should be understood as responsibility, in the context of a new type of anthropocentrism, referred to as “responsible” or “paternalistic”, whereby man, placed in a position of prominence over all other beings, does not relate to them from a position of dominion, as a master, but as a responsible administrator, with the aim of preserving ecological balance from an intergenerational perspective. We are thus witnessing a significant shift, marking the transition from a rights-based anthropocentrism – where nature is the object of legal claims by a man in a position of superiority and dominance – to a duty-based anthropocentrism – where nature remains an object, but of care and ecological stewardship by a man who now assumes a position of responsibility.

As for the second set of reasons, it is important to start from the fact that the environment consists of diverse and multifaceted dimensions, which emerge differently depending on the circumstances and factors at play in each case. Therefore, it requires forms of protection that reflect this complexity, safeguarding the multiple and changing balances that characterize various ecosystems. Consequently, defining environmental protection as a subjective right is inadequate as a legal guarantee tool, since such a right cannot be clearly identified or exercised without being tied to other aspects of an individual’s or the community’s legal sphere. This does not mean denying the importance of environmental protection as a precondition for the exercise and guarantee of human rights and collective interests, nor the possibility of identifying subjective rights partially related to specific aspects of the human–environment relationship (such as the right to a healthy environment or the right to access environmental information). However, what remains impossible is the configuration of a subjective right to the environment as such, which, in any case, would lack any effective legal enforceability.

As a result, qualifying environmental protection as a fundamental principle appears capable of offering real protection to the environment as a “constitutional value”; one that cannot be defined in abstract terms but requires case-by-case identification of its content, just as is true for other constitutional principles that are not abstractly definable or realizable.

These considerations are effectively summarized in the formula used by the constitutional legislator to reform Article 9 of the Italian Constitution, which, by assigning the Republic the task of making environmental protection effective, including in the interest of future generations, embraces the necessity for the legal system and public authorities to actively work to implement it. This ensures that existing environmental legislation assumes a new perspective, becoming the expression of a duty that characterizes the entire constitutional legal order, while also marking the recognition of an autonomy that opens up new possibilities for dialogue. Precisely because it is a fundamental principle, environmental protection serves as a guiding directive both for the creation and interpretation of law. Therefore, it directly addresses the interpreter, who is tasked with concretely realizing the principle, even without the intermediation of the legislator.

Ph. Chiara Bertoldi

Further readings and resources:

Marcatajo G. (2022) La riforma degli articoli 9 e 41 della Costituzione e la valorizzazione dell’ambiente. AmbienteDiritto.it, (2), 1-15.

Marchetti G. (2024) Il “principio fondamentale ambientalista” nella prospettiva multilivello e il suo impatto sull’assetto costituzionale italiano, Giappichelli, Torino.

Ronchetti L. (2024) Ecocostituzionalismo. La sovranità popolare di fronte alla crisi ecologica, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli.

Tripodina C. (2023) La tutela dell’ambiente nella Costituzione italiana: tra interessi delle generazioni future e responsabilità della generazione presente. Rivista Quadrimestrale di Diritto dell’Ambiente, (1), 332-349.