ECOLOGICAL RESPONSIBILITY
Sebastián Figueroa Rubio
The concept of responsibility is related to many of the ways in which we talk about how we respond to others. It is an ambiguous concept (Figueroa Rubio, 2019, ch. 1), so it is necessary to make some clarifications. First of all, we respond for what we have done by giving explanations and justifications for our actions, but we also do so by bearing the normative consequences assigned to what we are responsible for, such as punishments (Gardner, 2008). Moreover, in many cases we say that we will respond for things that have not occurred, but which we understand to be our responsibilities, either because they were assigned to us or because we take them as such (Gardner, 2017). With the concept of responsibility, then, we have both a view of the past and a view of the future. Following Peter Cane (2002, p. 31), the first can be called historical responsibility and the second prospective responsibility.
If we pay attention to our practices and institutions, we can identify four themes that shape our responsibility: 1) The sources of many of our duties, which we can call our responsibilities in the prospective sense mentioned above. 2) The violation of these duties, understood as what we can be held responsible for in retrospect. 3) This is related to the fact that this violation must be ascribed to us in order for us to be held responsible. Attributing a wrongdoing is to charge it to someone else’s account, holding that person responsible. 4) Finally, there is the reaction to the violation, its normative consequence (e.g. punishments and sanctions). The current ecological crisis and technological development have changed the way these four issues have normally been understood. What this means is outlined below.
With regard to prospective responsibilities, understood as a framework for identifying our specific duties, Hans Jonas’ classic text The Imperative of Responsibility (1979) has clarified a key issue. In this work, the author proposes a way of understanding our actions that contrasts with that classically used to explain our activity in the world. In particular, Jonas draws attention to the way in which technological development has changed how we interact with the environment, in the sense that the consequences of our actions are no longer clearly circumscribed and the impact of human actions on the planet can lead to the destruction of humanity itself. In this sense, it is no longer only the relationship with the people close to us and with whom we have direct relations that is ethically relevant, but also with future generations, as their very existence is at stake. And it is no longer only the lives and freedom of other humans that are of value for ethical purposes, but the intrinsic value of nature is also recognised. This gives rise to duties beyond our usual direct obligations toward others, as our responsibilities are now also defined by the need to protect and preserve the biosphere and socio-ecosystems. In other words, responsibilities are transformed, giving us obligations that expand our temporal and spatial concerns (Burdon, 2020).
This not only concerns morality, but also has legal and political resonances. As this ecological perspective affects our position as humanity, responsible agents include, as well as individuals, private and public institutions, corporations, non-governmental organisations, states and international organisations (Alam et al., 2013). This responsibility, in turn, partly shapes the meaning of ecological citizenship.
Although scientific knowledge about the impact of our actions on the planet has advanced in recent decades, it is still not entirely clear how each individual action contributes to environmental harm. For this reason, the generation of responsibilities appeals more to concepts such as risk, calculation of possibilities and identification and assignment of roles, rather than directly to concrete actions. In turn, principles such as precaution and prevention have been developed to assign responsibilities to the different actors. In this context, the principle of extended producer responsibility was also included, which considers the management of waste that may be generated by their products as part of producers’ responsibility. Finally, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility was included as a criterion, which is consecrated in international law and suggests that different states (and other actors) should contribute to addressing the problem based on their capabilities, global situation and historical role, rather than establishing direct causal relationships (Jolly & Trivedi, 2021). Similar ideas apply to broader issues of global justice (on the relationships and contrasts between these concepts, see Wissenburg, 2006).
In view of the above, in terms of historical responsibility, the identification of illicit acts has changed. Thus, we are dealing with the concept of environmental harm, which goes beyond the traditional notion of harm understood as the impairment of property or the physical or moral integrity of individuals. Indeed, the concept of environmental harm also encompasses the harms associated with climate change, the problems caused by waste and pollution, and the degradation of biodiversity (White, 2010, ch. 1). By including these elements in the concept of harm, it is not necessary to consider an individual directly affected in order to understand that a good worthy of protection has been illicitly affected.
The foregoing has led to the development of specific legislation in various countries and international law. It has also led to the development of specific research on how these harms occur and who the perpetrators and victims are, leading to what is called green criminology. Green criminology examines these crimes on the basis of their social, political and economic causes and consequences, revealing the complex panorama in which environmental harms take place and their consequences in different spheres of life. (Lynch et al., 2019; Brisman et al., 2015).
The principles of prevention and precaution remain important in determining whether a duty has been breached. In this context, the ascription of responsibility for environmental damage is usually associated with strict liability schemes where it is not relevant whether the person to whom the event is attributed acted intentionally or negligently. In this sense, the role someone plays within a structure can be sufficient in many cases as a relevant link. Moreover, traditional notions of causality used to determine the link between people’s actions and harm are also affected (Smiley, 1992; Percival, 2010). In these cases there is usually a multiplicity of agents involved, non-linear causal relationships exist, and problems of causal under- and over-determination arise. In this context, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility is also useful, as it makes it possible to determine the degree of control that different actors have over what is happening in order to determine to whom it should be attributed. Finally, it should be noted that much of the application of these imputation principles and rules has to do with the fact that proving environmental damage can be immensely expensive and the risk of not acting is very high.
Finally, it should be noted that the reaction to illegal acts and the causing of harm are also subject to change. On the one hand, punitive damages (i.e. the obligation to pay compensation in excess of the damage to be compensated, usually imposed as a deterrent measure or exemplary punishment) have been introduced in various countries in addition to the traditional penalties for illicit acts, indicating the role played by certain actors and the activity they carry out, and not only the damage they cause. On the other hand, beyond the existence of retributive elements such as sanctions, the focus is centred on the generation of repair and mitigation policies for the harm caused. These measures relate not only to the harm caused, but also to the need to create sustainable systems over time. In this way, new prospective responsibilities arise for the actors involved. Lastly, the complexity of the nature of the harm requires the inclusion of multiple perspectives in its identification and the best way to overcome it. In this line, restorative justice processes have been developed to include the perspectives of specialised public and private agencies, as well as those of people and communities affected by the harm and representatives of nature’s interests. In this way, restorative policies have been developed that aim to heal those affected (individuals, communities, other species and ecosystems) and to create new narratives in which all actors participate and thus work together to overcome ecological problems (Forsyth et.al., 2021). In this way, a dynamic emerges in which prospective and historical responsibilities complement each other to protect ecosystems and manage socio-ecological conflicts.
Bibliography:
Alam, S., Bhuiyan, J., Chowdhury, T & Techera, E. (Eds). (2013). Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law. Routledge.
Brisman, A., South, N. & White, R. (Eds). (2019). Environmental Crime and Social Conflict: Contemporary and Emerging Issues. Ashgate Publishing.
Burdon, P.D. (2020). Obligations in the Anthropocene. Law Critique, 31, 309–328.
Cane, P. (2002). Responsibility in Law and Morality. Hart Publishing.
Figueroa Rubio, S. (2019). Adscripción y reacción. Responsabilidad jurídica y moral desde una perspectiva interpersonal. Marcial Pons.
Gardner, J. (2008). Hart and Feinberg on Responsibility. In M. Kramer, C. Grant, B. Colburn, A. Hatzistavrou (Eds.), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political and Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Gardner, J. (2017). The Negligence Standard: Political Not Metaphysical. In J. Gardner (Ed.), Torts and Other Wrongs. Oxford University Press.
Jolly, S. & Trivedi, A. (2021) Principle of CBDR-RC: Its Interpretation and Implementation Through NDCS in the Context of Sustainable Development. Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy. 11 (3), 309-348.
Jonas, H. (1979). The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics for the Technological Age. The University of Chicago Press.
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