Veganism
Cristian Moyano-Fernández
Veganism is an ethical position, a social practice, and, in many cases, a personal identity that advocates excluding — as far as is possible and practicable — the use of non-human animals for human purposes, particularly in food, clothing, entertainment, and experimentation. Although in everyday usage it is often associated with a diet that avoids animal-derived products, in philosophical discourse veganism is understood more broadly as a normative critique of various forms of animal exploitation and as a proposal for transforming the relationships between human beings and other animals. In this sense, it is not limited to a set of consumption habits, but entails a stance regarding the kinds of moral consideration owed to animals and how social practices should be organised accordingly.
To better understand veganism, it is useful to distinguish it from vegetarianism, a practice that has historically been more widespread and which involves the exclusion of meat from the diet while potentially allowing other animal-derived products such as dairy and eggs. For millennia, vegetarianism has been motivated by religious, cultural, health-related, or ethical considerations, and it shares with veganism certain criticisms of animal exploitation, although it tends to focus more narrowly on dietary practices. By contrast, veganism extends this concern to other areas of everyday life, such as the use of animal-derived materials, entertainment, and experimentation, presenting itself as a more comprehensive ethical position that encompasses a broader range of human interactions with non-human animals. Nevertheless, there is a degree of overlap between the two practices, since many criticisms of the use of animals in cosmetics, bullfighting, and other domains may also be shared by forms of ethical vegetarianism. As a result, the relationship between veganism and vegetarianism is better understood as a continuum than as a strict dichotomy.
The term “veganism” was coined in 1944 by Donald Watson, co-founder of the Vegan Society in the United Kingdom, in a context in which vegetarian traditions already existed for ethical, religious, or health-related reasons. However, from its inception veganism was distinguished by its aspiration to ethical consistency, extending the refusal of animal exploitation beyond diet to other domains of everyday life. Over time, the concept has acquired greater philosophical density, becoming integrated into broader debates on justice, rights, suffering, sustainability, and relations of power. Indeed, the development of animal ethics in the second half of the twentieth century contributed to providing veganism with more systematic theoretical foundations, placing it in dialogue with various strands of contemporary moral philosophy (Regan, 2004; Francione, 2008; Singer, 2015).
From a utilitarian perspective, veganism is grounded in the consideration of animal suffering and well-being. According to this line of thought, the capacity to suffer or experience pleasure is the relevant criterion for inclusion within the moral community (Singer, 2015). This implies, at least in principle, that the interests of animals should be considered impartially, regardless of species membership. Consequently, practices such as intensive livestock, experimentation, or the use of animals in cosmetics or entertainment are morally problematic insofar as they generate significant suffering that could be avoided through available alternatives. This formulation has been the subject of debate regarding the scope of such moral consideration, particularly in relation to animals with simpler nervous systems, such as certain invertebrates and insects, for whom the attribution of subjective experiences remains contested in the scientific and philosophical literature. Consequently, the extent of the moral circle may vary depending on the theoretical framework adopted, although utilitarian veganism tends to progressively expand the range of morally relevant beings in accordance with the available evidence concerning their capacity to suffer.
Nevertheless, large-scale practices such as intensive livestock farming, fishing, animal experimentation, and the use of animals in cosmetics or entertainment are morally problematic insofar as they cause significant suffering to a large number of sentient animals, suffering that could be avoided through available alternatives. Veganism thus appears as a means of minimising harm and promoting greater overall welfare (Aaltola, 2012).
From deontological approaches, veganism is grounded in the idea that animals possess inherent value that cannot be reduced to their usefulness for human beings. Thinkers such as Tom Regan have argued that many animals are “subjects-of-a-life”, that is, individuals with experiences, interests, and a subjective perspective (see Animal Agency), which grants them basic moral rights (2004). On this view, animal exploitation is not merely a matter of negative consequences for welfare, but a violation of principles of justice. Accordingly, veganism is not presented as one option among others, but as an ethical requirement derived from respect for these subjects (Francione, 2008; Garner, 2013).
A key concept in the justification of veganism is “speciesism”, understood as discrimination based on species membership (Horta, 2010). This notion establishes a critical parallel with other forms of discrimination, such as racism or sexism, by arguing that systematically privileging human interests solely on the basis of belonging to the species Homo sapiens lacks sufficient moral justification. The critique of speciesism does not entail denying interspecies differences, but rather questioning whether such differences justify practices that cause harm or unjustified instrumentalisation. In this sense, veganism proposes an expansion of the moral circle to include non-human animals as direct objects of moral consideration.
Veganism has also been developed within perspectives such as the ethics of care and ecofeminism, which emphasise vulnerability, relational autonomy, structures of domination, and the interdependent and eco-dependent relations that sustain the fabric of nature (see Ecofeminism, Interdependence, and Eco-dependence). For instance, authors such as Carol J. Adams have analysed how the objectification of animal and human bodies shares parallel symbolic and material logics, particularly in patriarchal contexts (1990). From these approaches, veganism is not limited to questions of rights or utility calculations, but is linked to the transformation of sensibilities, practices, and social structures that sustain various forms of oppression. Empathy, attentiveness to vulnerability, and relational responsibility play a central role here, allowing veganism to be articulated with a gender-sensitive perspective that acknowledges the diversity of experiences and avoids abstract universalisation (Donovan & Adams 2007; Gruen, 2015).
Similarly, some contemporary currents understand veganism as a transformation of the subject and a civilisational transition oriented toward the consideration of those beings most vulnerable within our societies, rather than as an isolated or purely abstract duty (Pelluchon, 2018). This view can be connected to virtue ethics, according to which the systematic exploitation of non-human animals normalises vices and fosters insensitivity to violence and instrumentalisation, whereas embracing a vegan philosophy may contribute to shaping a more compassionate, responsible, and just moral character.
In its practical dimension, veganism involves the exclusion of animal-derived products from the diet — such as meat, fish, dairy, and eggs — as well as the rejection of materials such as leather, wool, or silk, and products tested on animals. It also entails avoiding, as far as possible, activities involving animal exploitation, such as certain forms of entertainment or tourism. The reference to what is “possible and practicable” introduces a degree of flexibility that acknowledges contextual constraints, such as inequalities in access to resources, geographical conditions, or medical needs. This clause has been the subject of debate, as it raises questions about the limits of moral demandingness and the conditions of its application in diverse contexts. In this regard, it also opens up the discussion of whether veganism should be formulated in terms of universal deontological and abolitionist principles — establishing strict obligations regardless of circumstances (Francione, 2008) — or whether it should instead be understood through utilitarian approaches that allow for gradual reduction of animal exploitation, or through more context-sensitive frameworks such as virtue ethics or the ethics of care, which attend to particularities and to moral character formation (Donovan & Adams, 2007; Gruen, 2015).
However, these latter approaches may be criticised for risking a slide into forms of welfarism or reformism, according to which the continued use of animals is legitimised as long as their conditions are improved, rather than questioning their instrumentalisation as such. Academic debate on gradualist, contextualist, and pragmatist accounts of veganism has been recurrent over the past two decades, particularly regarding whether incremental reforms constitute a strategic step toward abolition or, conversely, a normalisation of exploitation (Fischer, 2019). In this respect, it has been proposed to distinguish between moral monism at the theoretical level — a unified moral horizon — and ethical pluralism in practice (Sebo, 2023), which consists in applying different rules of action depending on the case.
Along similar lines, it is worth noting that veganism has also been the subject of debate regarding cultural practices that involve the use or killing of animals in non-industrial contexts. In a number of cases, such as among certain Indigenous Amazonian communities, Inuit populations, or pastoralist groups in the Sahel and Central Asia, relationships with animals are embedded within systems of subsistence, cosmologies, and lifestyles in which their use is understood not solely in terms of exploitation, but also in terms of reciprocity, material necessity, or ecological balance. This has generated discussions between universalist approaches and more ethnographic or intercultural perspectives, which emphasise the need to analyse such practices within their specific historical, symbolic, and material contexts.
Likewise, rural communities and several groups of ecologists critical of veganism have argued that relationships between humans and animals may involve complex forms of ecological interdependence, such that particular types of animal husbandry can generate benefits for ecosystems as a whole and for other animals. For example, it has been suggested that some domesticated animals and extensively farmed livestock may play important roles in soil fertilisation, the maintenance of biocultural landscapes that support habitats for some non-human species, the control of plant biomass, nutrient cycling, or even the provision of mechanical traction in post-oil scenarios. In light of these considerations, some have questioned whether the complete exclusion of animal use is always compatible with certain approaches to environmental sustainability and conservation. This may give rise to a potential paradox for veganism: the exploitation of some animals could, sometimes, contribute to improving the living conditions of others.
Nonetheless, despite these disagreements, veganism also aligns with many environmental concerns and ecological commitments, insofar as both movements often converge in arguing that most systems of animal production have significant impacts in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, resource use, and biodiversity loss. Although not all arguments grounded in environmental ethics necessarily lead to veganism, there is broad consensus that plant-based diets can contribute to significantly reducing human pressure on ecosystems and natural habitats, albeit with variation depending on production models and local contexts. This dimension has fostered convergence between veganism and certain strands of environmentalism (Tafalla, 2022), while also giving rise to debates on the most appropriate strategies for achieving sustainable and just food systems (Fischer, 2019).
Among frequent non-academic critiques of veganism are those appealing to tradition, naturalness, normality, or the centrality of human interests (Joy, 2013). Some positions argue that animal consumption is a constitutive part of human history and culture, or that human beings possess moral priority that justifies their use. Vegan responses typically emphasise that appeals to tradition are insufficient to justify morally problematic practices — just as the existence of traditions such as slavery does not justify their continuation today — and that the priority of human interests must be assessed case by case, especially when it involves avoidable harm to other sentient beings. Other objections point to issues of accessibility and social justice, arguing that veganism may be difficult to adopt in certain biogeographical or socio-economic contexts. In response, contemporary strands advocate for an intersectional veganism that takes into account factors such as class, gender, ethnicity, or geographical location, and avoids imposing abstract standards disconnected from material realities (Garner, 2013).
Beyond individual conduct, veganism constitutes a global social movement aimed at transforming not only consumption practices but also production structures, land use planning, and public policies (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011). It therefore encompasses diverse forms of activism, from education and public outreach to political advocacy and direct action. Within this framework, veganism may again converge with other movements, such as food justice, animal rights, and ecological transition, contributing to a rethinking of fundamental questions concerning the place of human beings in the world and the conditions for more just multispecies coexistence. Its growing visibility in public debate appears to reflect shifts in contemporary moral sensibilities, as well as persistent tensions between different models of life, production, and consumption.
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