Ecological Ethics
Fernando Arribas-Herguedas
Ecological ethics is a philosophical discipline that considers the moral value of living beings, ecosystems and the biosphere, as well as our obligations towards them. The fundamental question it addresses is whether moral consideration should extend beyond the human species and on what grounds such an extension could be justified (see Posthumanism). It is worth noting that, although the term ‘environmental ethics’ is widely used Spanish-language literature, some authors prefer the term ‘ecological ethics’ because they feel it better reflects the continuity and interdependence of human beings and the rest of the living world.
Although the term ‘ecological ethics’ emerged in the early 1970s, its main theoretical insights can already be found in A Sand County Almanac, a 1949 work by the American naturalist Aldo Leopold. Drawing on the relational view of the world characteristic of scientific ecology, Leopold argued for the extension of our moral obligations to animals, plants, and ecosystems. However, he was not the only precursor; other authors, such as the Europeans Albert Schweitzer and Fritz Jahr, had anticipated some of the fundamental premises of a biocentric ethics in the early decades of the 20th century (Riechmann, 2025). The publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 also stands as a foundational milestone for ecological ethics as a discipline.
Scientific evidence of the impact of human activity on the biosphere forms the epistemological foundation of ecological ethics. Without the contributions of ecology, the extension of moral consideration beyond the human species would lack a solid empirical basis. For this reason, ecological ethics often takes the form of a meta-ethical reflection on the properties that confer moral relevance on living beings, species, and ecosystems (see Animal agency, Plant agency). Ecological ethics also aims to establish normative principles of universal scope, a requirement derived from the nature of the problems it addresses. Collective responses to global challenges such as climate change are difficult to justify from strictly relativist positions. While there are theoretical currents that question the universalist assumptions of the modern philosophical tradition, consistent acceptance of moral relativism appears incompatible with many of its own normative claims.
The meta-ethical question of moral relevance is typically addressed by attributing intrinsic value to the non-human world or to some of its parts. Intrinsic value is defined as the value that an entity possesses in and of itself, regardless of any utility it may provide in satisfying human needs or desires. In the latter case, we would speak of instrumental value. Many ethical theories consider the possession of intrinsic value to be a sufficient reason to recognise moral duties towards the entity that possesses it. Since most traditional ethical theories have reserved this type of value for human beings and their interests, extending it to the non-human world could provide a stronger basis for the demands for the protection and preservation of nature (see Rights of Nature).
Three main approaches are usually distinguished in this debate. Anthropocentric theories maintain that intrinsic value pertains exclusively to human beings or their interests. From this perspective, nature can be conserved by appealing to the various instrumental values it holds for humans, including scientific, aesthetic and cultural values, as well as the obligations we have towards future generations (de-Shalit, 1995) (see Intergenerational Justice). These positions are often grouped under the term ‘weak anthropocentrism’, in contrast to more traditional anthropocentric conceptions, which reduce nature to a mere repository of resources for human use.
Weak anthropocentrism largely emerged as a response to the radical critique of the Western philosophical tradition set out in some of the foundational texts of ecological ethics. Some authors, such as Richard Routley (1973), have argued for the need to construct a ‘new ethics’, whilst Lynn White (1967) attributed the ecological crisis to the Judeo-Christian worldview and its alleged instrumentalisation of nature. In response to these interpretations, John Passmore (1974) defended the Western tradition by appealing to the idea of ‘stewardship’ (see Public trust doctrine), as opposed to the widespread image of ‘man as despot’. The growing complexity of the debates on intrinsic value subsequently led Bryan Norton (1991) to formulate the ‘convergence hypothesis’. His proposal sought to provide a rational basis for obligations towards nature by shifting the focus away from ontological and meta-ethical controversies to practical agreements. Over time, weak anthropocentrism and the extension of human interests have become a theoretical framework for ideas such as sustainable development and green liberalism.
Secondly, biocentric theories argue that all living organisms possess intrinsic value, regardless of their utility to human beings. According to various authors, this value is grounded in capacities such as sentience or in the fact that every living being possesses an inherent good or a telos, the realisation of which may be facilitated or impeded. Building on these premises, biocentric positions have articulated both consequentialist arguments—according to which the moral correctness of an action depends on its consequences for living organisms (Attfield, 2014)—, and deontological approaches, which assert that there are unconditional moral duties and rights that must be honoured regardless of their consequences (Taylor, 1986). In its early stages, biocentrism shared part of its theoretical framework with animal ethics as developed by authors such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan. This was particularly evident in their critique of traditional anthropocentrism. However, biocentrism broadened the scope of moral consideration beyond animals to include plants and all living organisms.
Finally, ecocentric theories argue that moral value lies not in individual organisms, but in species, biotic communities, ecosystems, or indeed the biosphere as a whole (see Organicism). The holistic worldview that defines ecocentrism holds that individual living beings are part of broader ecological systems on which they depend and to which they contribute. From this perspective, moral obligations arise towards these systems, rather than solely towards the organisms that comprise them. Ecocentric approaches tend to favour the term ‘ecological ethics’ as the most appropriate to describe their position, since, unlike anthropocentrism and biocentrism, their assumptions are explicitly inspired by the ontological and epistemological principles of scientific ecology. Some of these proposals found support in the Gaia hypothesis put forward by James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis, which conceives of the biosphere as a self-regulating system whose parts maintain complex interdependent relationships (see Interdependence and Ecodependence).
Ecocentrism calls for a fundamental re-examination of some of the key assumptions underlying modern Western thought. The main targets of its criticism include Cartesian and Newtonian mechanicism, as well as the dualism between human beings and nature, which is said to play a decisive role in legitimising the instrumental domination of the latter. Consequently, ecocentrism does not generally conceive of ecological ethics as a mere applied ethics, comparable to bioethics or business ethics, but rather as the project of a new ethics grounded in an alternative ontology that transcends dominant Western metaphysics. In this sense, some ecocentric theories engage in dialogue with non-Western philosophical and religious traditions, such as Buddhism or Hinduism, as well as with various forms of indigenous and ancestral knowledge, in which the relationship between human beings and nature is conceived in terms of continuity and interdependence (Jamieson, 2001; Callicott, 2017) (see Animism and Buen Vivir).
Aldo Leopold is often regarded as the founder of ecocentric ethics, as he advocated extending moral consideration to the biotic communities that make up the Earth. He was also one of the first authors to attribute objective value to ecological properties such as the integrity, stability and beauty of ecosystems. Among those who have continued his ‘Land Ethic’, John Baird Callicott stands out. Inspired by Leopold and Darwin (see Darwinism), Callicott interprets ethics as an evolutionary adaptation that has favoured the progressive expansion of the moral community. He also accords moral priority to the biotic community over individual organisms, including human beings. These ideas have been criticised both from the perspective of animal ethics and from anthropocentric standpoints. Nevertheless, Callicott subsequently revised certain aspects of his proposal to make it more inclusive.
Meanwhile, Holmes Rolston III has developed an ecocentric theory that aims to build bridges with animal ethics. Unlike Callicott, he argues that value is an objective property of the natural world. Every organism possesses a telos that confers intrinsic value upon it, although this may vary according to capacities such as sentience or self-awareness. Rolston further extends moral consideration to species, ecosystems and the biosphere, understood as life-generating processes. The ecosystem thus becomes a fundamental unit of moral consideration and the bearer of a ‘systemic value’ independent of its recognition by human beings (Rolston, 1988).
Finally, deep ecology is one of the most influential formulations of ecocentrism. In an article published in 1972, Arne Naess distinguished between ‘shallow’ ecology, which focuses on remedying environmental problems without questioning the foundations of industrial society, and ‘deep’ ecology, which is based on a relational view of the world that emphasises the interdependence between human beings and nature (see Environmentalism). Based on this premise, deep ecology advocates a form of biocentric egalitarianism that recognises the intrinsic value of all living beings and their right to flourish – principles later developed in the well-known ‘eight-point platform’ drawn up by Naess and George Sessions (Devall and Sessions, 1985). For Naess, two central concepts are ‘identification’ and ‘self-realisation’: the more fully a human being identifies with the natural world, the more complete their personal fulfilment becomes. This shift in worldview would lead to profound transformations in both individual behaviour and social organisation.
Unlike other ecocentric approaches, deep ecology attaches particular importance to the transformation of consciousness and to the re-evaluation of the modern image of the human being as an entity separate from nature. Indeed, it denies that there is an ontological separation between human beings and the rest of nature: the self-realisation of the ‘self’ transcends the limits of its own body in a process of identification with the planetary biotic community. The ‘ecosophy’ proposed by Naess —one of many possible approaches— is based on these fundamental ideas. This spiritualist orientation closely links deep ecology with Buddhism and transpersonal psychology, as reflected in the work of Joanna Macy and Warwick Fox.
Although anthropocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism constitute the main positions in the debate on the moral treatment of nature, other relevant schools of thought, such as ecofeminism, social ecology and environmental justice (see Ecosocial Justice), have challenged this classification, considering it insufficient in its attention to power relations and social inequalities. From these perspectives, authors such as Murray Bookchin (see Eco-anarchism) and Ramachandra Guha have criticised the fascination of some ecocentric trends with unspoilt nature and their scant attention to the links between ecological harm and social justice. Similarly, ecofeminist authors such as Karen Warren and Val Plumwood pointed out that structures of domination over nature are closely linked to other forms of oppression, particularly those of a patriarchal nature.
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