Ecological Vulnerability
Carlos H. González Bellene
In a general sense, vulnerability refers to the susceptibility of an entity to being affected or altered by external factors. Only a limited consensus is possible regarding this minimal notion of vulnerability, given that the plurality and heterogeneity of disciplines and theoretical and epistemological approaches employing the term diverge with respect to almost every additional or more substantive feature. Thus, “vulnerability” acquires more precise nuances as each field of analysis delimits, primarily, the entity with respect to which such a propensity to harm or detriment is predicated.
At a technical level, “ecological” and “environmental” vulnerability are two terms that are used interchangeably in certain contexts. Thus, within quantitative approaches to the analysis of natural systems and environmental engineering, the concept of ecological vulnerability is fully consolidated, although the adjective environmental is used as its equivalent. Together with the idea of vulnerability, these terms are employed in ecometric studies or environmental impact analyses to measure the state and changes of ecosystems and to detect weak points where degradation may occur. From this perspective, various ways of defining vulnerability coexist, depending on whether emphasis is placed on the level of susceptibility to harm or on the system’s capacity to resist or adapt –its resilience– (Adger, 2006, see ecological collapse).
In applied contexts, a broad definition refers to the “degree to which the capacity of an ecological system to maintain ecosystem functions is affected by the adverse effects of threats of various kinds: punctual or continuous, endogenous or exogenous” (Berrouet et al., 2018, p. 636, author´s translation). Although in this field the notion was originally associated with the study of natural disaster risk, its use now extends to the sensitivity of natural systems to any form of disturbance (Freitas Scaraffuni & Achkar Borrás, 2024, p. 106). In other words, ecological vulnerability is used in this sense to denote the property of a system of being exposed to harm or disturbance from external sources, regardless of whether such sources are natural or human in origin.
In this regard, ecological vulnerability may be conceived as a parameter in the construction of indicators aimed at assessing critical points within a natural system, oriented towards both its understanding and the mitigation and management of environmental risks and disasters (Adger, 2006; Beroya-Eitner, 2016; Freitas Scaraffuni & Achkar Borrás, 2024, p. 114). It is also debated which variables such indicators should incorporate, such as the characteristics of ecosystems deemed valuable, the types of possible risks, and the systems’ capacity to withstand them; and studies in this area frequently also apply such indicators to the assessment of specific ecosystems (see Eakin & Luers, 2006). This perspective plays a decisive role in analysing human impact as a risk factor in the vulnerability of natural environments. Indeed, it is at this level that consideration of the human role acquires greater explanatory depth, particularly when attention is paid to the fragility of ecosystems and the incidence of phenomena such as denialism, which hinder the recognition of, and appropriate responses to, such risks.
Similarly, the legal field employs the expressions “ecological vulnerability” and “environmental vulnerability”. Although the notion of vulnerability is widely disseminated in law and admits of diverse meanings, those normative sectors regulating the relationship between human beings and the environment have incorporated it at an early stage as a basis for the protection of ecosystems (Alenza García, 2019). This development is closely linked to the climate crisis and the so-called socio-ecological crisis, understood as the deterioration of the equilibria arising from the interaction between human activities and natural systems, as well as their reciprocal effects (Serra Palao, p. 230). Indeed, in the legal field, numerous debates of philosophical origin concerning the conceptualisation of being and nature have found expression, partly due to the dynamic and mutable character of legal norms and definitions, which are open to substantial shifts in worldviews (see Ecological Law, Ecological state, Ecological Constitution, Ecological Property, and the Public Trust Doctrine).
This philosophical perspective has noted that, although in the aforementioned technical fields they are used as synonyms, the expression “ecological vulnerability” has greater potential to capture the complexity of the relations between human beings and the rest of nature than “environmental vulnerability”, regardless of its undifferentiated use across many disciplines. Thus, the tension between the human as both cause and recipient of ecological risks is traversed by a debate between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, which prompts reflection on the point of departure: do we approach technical issues from the human end or from the environmental one? Does accepting this dilemma not entail denying ecodependence? The need to reconcile the human perspective with a new ecological sensibility thus becomes evident (see Gaia and Animism).
Lloredo Alix observes that the natural and the socio-cultural, given their strong interrelations, are not clearly separated, although it is also reductive to conceive everything—including humans—as “nature” (2026, pp. 14–17). This debate on what we understand by nature structures the contrast between anthropocentrism, which places the human being at the centre and emphasises its dominion over the environment, and ecocentrism, which understands it as part of that same natural world and stresses the impact of its actions (Beorlegui, 2021, p. 331). Contemporary approaches have emerged that attribute categories of subjectivity to it. Thus, agency is recognised in various forms of life –including plant agency– when examining their “sensitivity” or capacity to “respond” to disturbances (Figueroa Rubio, forthcoming), and they are even conceived as vulnerable entities, a feature traditionally reserved for human beings. As Martha A. Fineman has noted, given our embodied ontology, all human beings are inevitably and intrinsically vulnerable, dependent on care and capable of constructing systems of resilience, since vulnerability is a universal and constant feature of the human condition (2025, ch. 2).
Thus, the idea of vulnerability, although applicable to entities as diverse as an information system or a political regime, evokes an essentially subjective characteristic which –as in Fineman’s approach– is used to identify and promote a moral, political and/or legal duty to act upon vulnerability, that is, to ground obligations of protection and care.
In the realm of nature, it is common –and to some extent intuitive– to attribute subjectivity to animals, particularly those closest to human beings, such as domestic animals or hominids. This proximity facilitates the identification of shared traits, as well as their perception as vulnerable subjects and, consequently, as deserving of a certain moral and legal protection (Satz, 2016, pp. 176–177). However, the operation becomes more problematic when it comes to ecosystems or more complex entities –some perspectives even attribute subjectivity to the planet itself, with the Gaia hypothesis as a paradigmatic embodiment of this approach–. In this sense, the subjectivisation of nature is particularly significant, insofar as it entails attributing to it a densely human property that tends to interpret certain changes as degradation of its modes of life (see Rights of Nature).
This discussion has provided the backdrop for Berreza Guimarães and Dalla Corte (2024) to propose, from a juridical-philosophical perspective, a tripartite distinction between approaches to the human-nature relationship and to identify their differing impact on the notion of vulnerability. On the one hand, the dominant anthropocentric paradigm focuses the notion of vulnerability on the human being, including extended versions that encompass concerns about the potential harm to the welfare of future generations caused by environmental impact. Thus, its concerns are oriented either towards the ways in which society may manage risks inherent in human fragility, or towards so-called “environmental injustices” –which examine the differential impact of human-induced environmental harm on certain social groups– or towards the (in)capacity to confront environmental disasters of natural origin (pp. 5–11). On the other hand, from a transitional perspective between anthropocentrism and ecocentrism, nature is seen not merely as an instrument for human life but as an integral part of communities aspiring to be just (p. 11). This paradigm shift enables the move from the environmental to the ecological, insofar as it allows subjective characteristics to be attributed to nature and thus its “own” vulnerabilities to be acknowledged, thereby overcoming the idea of vulnerability exclusively oriented towards human beings (pp. 11–14). Finally, a radical paradigm emphasises the necessary interdependence between forms of life, the culture of common life, and “good life”, and allows nature to be redefined as an eco-dependent community comprising society, environment, and territory (p. 15).
Building on this approach to paradigms concerning the relationship between human beings and nature, Berreza Guimarães and Dalla Corte (2024) distinguish between “environmental vulnerability” and “ecological vulnerability”. The former corresponds to an anthropocentric perspective, which regards the human being as the only entity capable of vulnerability, even when such vulnerability arises from its environment. By contrast, as intrinsic value is progressively recognised in nature and, ultimately, an ecocentric outlook is adopted, its vulnerabilities come to be conceived as “ecological”. From this latter perspective, nature and human beings form an interdependent system with intrinsic value; ecological vulnerability therefore does not refer to an isolated entity, but to a socio-ecological assemblage. Consequently, the subject of so-called “rights of nature” may also be understood as a socio-ecosystem whose social and ecological dimensions are constitutively interdependent.
Still, it is important to note that this distinction between environmental and ecological vulnerability, although of strong explanatory and communicative potential, is neither widely established nor uncontroversial, nor is the underlying theoretical framework itself. Poole Derqui, for instance, has argued against the usefulness of the ecocentric paradigm for achieving its stated aims (2024). The very idea of vulnerability as a legal category for expanding rights has been challenged –among other reasons– on the grounds that it produces paradoxically opposite effects, such as the weakening of equality-based categories or the resurgence –contrario sensu– of a neo-liberal, hyper-responsible subject (Giolo, 2018, pp. 255–258).
Beyond certain core ideas, anthropocentrism, ecocentrism and intermediate positions are not monolithic currents, but rather diverse and nuanced approaches. However, a shift in perspective that is difficult to reverse has emerged—a certain “ecologisation of debate”—grounded in the idea that human life and nature are intrinsically interrelated. Within this framework, approaches emphasising the embedding of human beings within a broader context gain relevance, giving rise to conceptual reconfigurations such as ecological citizenship, eco-dependence, or ecological agency.
From this standpoint, reserving the term ecological vulnerability for the cases proposed by Berreza Guimarães and Dalla Corte may allow the environmental aspect of the expression to be used for those sub-cases in which the human being is not the agent generating vulnerability in the ecosystem, but rather the subject exposed to forms of vulnerability derived from their environment, not exclusively natural. This dimension refers to the fragility of persons in light of their contextual conditions, insofar as the notion of vulnerability may also encompass the affectation of subjects by their environment.
From a feminist perspective, Pozzolo (2019) has emphasised the importance of distinguishing between vulnerability conceived as a personal trait and vulnerability understood as a contextual condition, which shifts the focus from the individual to the structures and environments within which they are situated. In a similar vein, Luna (2009) proposes not conceiving vulnerability as a homogeneous label, but rather as a stratified notion composed of multiple layers depending on the relations between subjects and contexts. Thus, a subject may simultaneously be intrinsically vulnerable –for instance, as a newborn– and environmentally vulnerable –if born in an area devastated by war, lacking the basic means for development–. This reconstruction allows vulnerability to be understood not as a fixed state or a stable property of individuals, but as a dynamic condition that is activated and redistributed according to concrete social configurations. Its analytical value lies, therefore, in making visible the ways in which certain structures produce or intensify exposure to harm, showing that vulnerability is also an effect of social organisation and not merely a prior condition of subjects.
Within this framework, and in line with the perspectives of Pozzolo and Luna, it is appropriate to reserve the notion of environmental vulnerability for that which is not exhausted by the fragility of ecosystems, but instead attends to the ways in which a person’s capacities may be limited, conditioned, or even suppressed by their environment, given eco-dependence. From this perspective, vulnerability does not reside in the individual considered in isolation, but in the interaction between their conditions and the contexts in which they operate. In particular, processes of environmental change –including so-called “ecological change” (see Global Change (Climate Change))– directly affect the effective possibilities of human action and development, thereby revealing another dimension of ecological vulnerability which is simultaneously contextual, relational, and structural. Between the human and the non-human, vulnerability appears as the name of an interdependence that we have not yet fully succeeded in thinking through.
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